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INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001, attacks and several actions of the U.S.
Administration have sparked debate and litigation with respect to vari-
ous matters of great significance under international, constitutional,
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston.
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and federal statutory law. Since international law is part of the law of
the United States, has constitutional moorings, and can influence the
content of constitutional and statutory norms, some of the legal issues
are manifestly intertwined. Among them are issues addressed in the
following Article that are organized in two Parts, one addressing cer-
tain erroneous post-9/11 claims, and the other addressing certain ad-
ditional errors and matters of great concern. An overarching focus
involves attention to relevant international law and some of the conse-
quences that might follow if certain changes in international law oc-
cur or if various misconceptions and violations continue. Some of the
consequences can bring dishonor and pose significant threats to our
democracy and to venerable American values.
I. SOME ERRONEOUS POST-9/11 CLAIMS
A. 9/11 's Supposed Radical Transformation of Legal Restraints
Did the dramatic, coordinated attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, require a radical
transformation of legal restraints with respect to U.S. responses to ter-
rorism? Film clips of airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center
and the subsequent burning and collapse of the towers, fleeing survi-
vors, faces of living victims, and pictures of some of those who per-
ished were repeated on television for weeks. Because film was
available and utilized repeatedly by the media, for some it seemed that
the attacks were occurring again and again, in our homes, and in ways
that unified the country in shock, sympathy, and perhaps anger. The
use of passenger airplanes as bombs against skyscrapers seemed new
and left many feeling vulnerable. Upon reflection, the media's repeti-
tion of the horrific destruction of symbolic skyscrapers in New York
City may have been a primary contributing factor to the nation's sense
of insecurity-and for some, may have contributed even to an intense
anxiety or a sense of terror. It is not unusual that terrorists plan or
hope for media contributions to their goals and even overreaction by
victim populations and their governments.'
Upon reflection, it is most unfortunate, but in human history the
dramatic 9/11 attacks were in many respects not unprecedented. Ob-
jective analysis also reveals that they were not transforming events re-
quiring radical changes in law. Planned and unlawful human violence
involving the loss of several thousand lives, although clearly serious
1 See, e.g., LEcAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 407, 415-16, 437-40,
459, 532, 590-91, 637 (Alona E. Evans &John F. Murphy eds., 1978); Symposium,
Terrorism and the Media, 53 IND. L.J. 619 (1978).
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and threatening, is not new and, in comparison to many other unac-
ceptable murderous assaults by nonstate actors that have occurred just
in the last two decades or in comparison to other crimes against hu-
manity, 2 the loss of even several thousand lives is relatively small.
Terrorism also is not new,3 nor is the use of terrorist tactics by
clandestine state and nonstate perpetrators against the U.S. govern-
ment and our nationals here4 and abroad. Even terrorist attacks on
the United States and our nationals attributed to al Qaeda were not
new. For example, Usama bin Laden and fourteen of his followers
had been indicted (some in absentia) for their participation in terror-
ist attacks on the U.S. embassies and our nationals and foreign nation-
als in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, which resulted in more
than 250 deaths and the injury of some 5500 persons. 5 Some of the
perpetrators who had been in custody were subsequently convicted.
6
There were also previous al Qaeda attacks in the United States on the
World Trade Center in 1993, attacks in Saudi Arabia on the Riyadh
training center and the Khobar Towers barracks in 1995 and 1996,
and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, among others.
Attention to terrorism during warfare also is not new. In fact,
twentieth century laws of war addressing permissible conduct during
actual armed conflicts, the status and rights of various persons, treat-
ment and interrogation, and other rights, duties and competencies
were formed partly with reference and in response to terrorism, 7 and
in contexts involving threats to "national security" at least as signifi-
cant and human deaths and injuries at least as numerous and horrific
2 See generallyJoRDANJ. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 857-915 (2d
ed. 2000) (concerning various contexts in which more extensive crimes against hu-
manity have taken place, and the nature and types of crimes against humanity).
3 See, e.g., Lake Erie & W. Ry. v. Bailey, 61 F. 683, 685 (S.D. Ohio 1882); Ireland
v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 60 (1977) (stating that "terrorist
activities... of individuals or of groups ... are in clear disregard of human rights"); I
Op. Att'y Gen. 52 (1794) (regarding terrorist publications); INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1975); LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM, supra note lpassim; PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 995-1017;
Symposium, Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697 (1987).
4 The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing is one prominent and relatively recent ex-
ample. See Daniel M. Filler, Values We Can Afford-Protecting Constitutional Rights in an
Age of Terrorism: A Response to Crona and Richardson, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 409
(1996).
5 See United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
6 See, e.g., United States v. bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
United States v. bin Laden, No. S(7)98 Cr. 1023(LBS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15484,
at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2001).
7 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Terrorism and the International Law of War, 64 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 11-17, 32, 36 (1974).
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as the 9/11 attacks. A few examples of express proscription of terror-
ism in time of war include the appearance of "systematic terrorism"
among the list of customary war crimes adopted by the Responsibili-
ties Commission of the Paris Peace Conference in 19198 and the pro-
hibition of terrorism in Article 33 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.9 Arti-
cles 5, 42, and 78 of the Geneva Convention also allow the detention
of certain persons who pose security threats during armed conflicts,
like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, if detention of particular individu-
als without trial is necessary and if they benefit from judicial review of
the propriety of their detention as required by the Geneva Conven-
tion and human rights law. 10 Addressing the 9/11 attacks and rele-
vant laws of war, the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State has
written that the terrorist attacks "challenged us to uphold our princi-
ples at a time of great fear and anger,""II adding: "This is not, however,
extraordinary... [and] the law of armed conflict.., has emerged in a
strong position, indeed without need for revision or amendment."'
12
Similarly, and more generally, there is no objective and policy-
serving reason to conclude that other fundamental legal restraints on
governmental responses to nonstate actor violence and terrorism
must be abandoned. For example, human rights and other constitu-
tional precepts and restraints 13 were developed and have survived also
in times of significant threats to national security, nonstate actor vio-
lence, and warfare. Post 9/11 Chicken Little visions of supposed ne-
cessity for radical transformations of legal norms are actually out of
focus and unacceptable. Recognized dangers of overreaction also are
8 See PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 32.
9 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308 [hereinafter
GC]. Concerning attention to terrorism in connection with the reach of the Geneva
Civilian Convention during actual war, see INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMEN-
TARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN TIME OF WAR 31, 225-26, 594 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter GC
COMMENTARY].
10 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 503, 507-14 (2003); see also infra Part I.E.
11 William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 319 (2003).
12 Id.
13 Human rights have been viewed since the time of the Founding and Framers as
relevant constitutional precepts and as useful aids for clarification of other constitu-
tional norms. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 193-359 (2d ed. 2003).
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not new. As the Supreme Court affirmed in Ex parte Milligan,14 in the
context of a major civil war, and in opposition to presidential claims
of necessity to detain persons allegedly posing threats to national
security:
Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors .... Those great
and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rul-
ers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by
sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and
proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in
peril, unless established by irrepealable law.... The Constitution of
the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and
in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involv-
ing more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of
the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly
to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is
based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all
the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its exis-
tence .... 15
The Court also emphasized that precisely at such times "the
President . . . is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere
of duty, which is to execute . . . [and not violate] the laws," 16 add-
ing: "[b]y the protection of the law human rights are secured; with-
draw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers."
17
Clearly, the Executive branch has no powers ex necessitateI8 and
14 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
15 Id. at 120-21; see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 335 (1946) (Mur-
phy, J., concurring) ("'The Constitution of the United States is law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.'") (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) at 120-21).
16 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating "he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," thus, there is simply no discre-
tion to violate the law); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612-13 (1838)
(noting that whatever discretion the President may have concerning implementation
of the law, the President can never lawfully violate the law); PAUST, supra note 13, at
169-73.
17 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 119.
18 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952);
see also id. at 597, 604, 610, 614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 629, 633 (Douglas,
J., concurring); id. at 646, 649-50 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 655, 659-60 (Bur-
ton, J., concurring); id. at 660-62 (Clark, J., concurring); supra note 16; infra note
19.
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no lawful authority to act outside the Constitution either here or
abroad. 19
B. Supposed "War" Against al Qaeda and International "Terrorism"
Claims have been made by the Bush Administration that the 9/11
attacks created a state of "war" between the United States and al
Qaeda as such, 20 but the number of al Qaeda targetings and resultant
losses of life, although substantial in some respects, did not mirror
those normally occurring during war. More importantly, as noted in a
previous essay, the United States cannot be at "war" with bin Laden
and al Qaeda as such.2 1 Bin Laden was never the leader or member of
a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group (as those entities are
understood in international law) that was at war with the United
States. Armed attacks by nonstate, nonnation, nonbelligerent, nonin-
surgent actors like bin Laden and members of al Qaeda can trigger
the right of selective and proportionate self-defense under the U.N.
Charter against those directly involved in processes of armed attack,
22
19 See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 713 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
"emergency powers" exist with Congress, not the President); PAUST, supra note 13, at
487-90, 497-503, 510. Justice Black's analysis in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), is
particularly apt: "[T]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.... Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act [at home or abroad] in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." Id. at 5-6; see also
supra note 15; infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citi-
zens in the War Against Terrorism, § 1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13,
2001) (containing President Bush's claim that the 9/11 attacks created "a state of
armed conflict"); Taft, supra note 11, at 320 ("initiating an armed conflict").
21 Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 345, 347-48 (2002); see atsoJordan J. Paust, War and Enemy
Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 326-28 (2003);
Warren Richey, Tribunals on Trial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 14, 2001, at 1 (quot-
ing Professor Leila Sadat explaining that "[t] he actions of Sept. 11 aren't war crimes,
they are civilian crimes"). Recently, a Second Circuit panel stated that "whether a
state of armed conflict exists against an enemy to which the laws of war apply is a
political question." Padilla, 352 F.3d at 712. The statement is in error, since numer-
ous cases have addressed legal issues raised with respect to whether, to whom, and
how the laws of war and related international laws in time of war apply. See, e.g.,
Paust, supra note 10, at 518-22. Eisentrager addressed merely the issue whether send-
ing our armed forces abroad was proper and even recognized that the judiciary will
determine that a state of war exists and enemy alien status. Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942); The Prize Cases,
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1862) (noting that the "Court is bound to notice"); Bas v.
Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
22 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 534-36 (2002).
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but even the use of military force by the United States merely against
bin Laden and al Qaeda in foreign territory would not create a state of
war between the United States and al Qaeda.
23
The lowest level of warfare or armed conflict to which certain
laws of war apply is an insurgency. For an insurgency to occur, the
insurgent group would have to have the semblance of a government,
an organized military force, control of significant portions of territory
as their own, and their own relatively stable population or base of sup-
port within a broader population. Al Qaeda never met any of the cri-
teria for insurgent status. Belligerent status under the laws of war is
based on the same criteria for insurgent status plus outside recogni-
tion by one or more states either as a belligerent or a state. 24 Al
Qaeda never met the criteria for insurgent status and certainly lacked
any outside recognition as a belligerent, nation, or state. Indeed, al
Qaeda is not known to have even purported to be or to have the char-
acteristics of a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent.
23 See War Powers, Libya, and State-Sponsored Terrorism: Hearing Before the House Sub-
comm. on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 99th Cong. 6-7 (1986) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Dep't of State), quoted inJoRDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION
IN THE U.S. 975 (2000) [hereinafter Sofaer]. In a different context, Sofaer noted that
[t]he President may decide to deploy specially trained antiterrorist units in
an effort to secure the release of the hostages or to capture the terrorists
who perpetrated the act .... [W]here no confrontation is expected between
our units and forces of another state . . . . such units can reasonably be
distinguished from 'forces equipped for combat.' And their actions against
terrorists differ greatly from the 'hostilities' contemplated by the [War Pow-
ers] Resolution.
Id.
24 Concerning well entrenched criteria regarding an insurgency or belligerency,
see, for example, The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1862). Criteria
include:
When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain
portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their
allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their
former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents.
Id. The Court also noted that, "Foreign nations acknowledge it as a war by a declara-
tion of neutrality ... recognizing hostilities as existing." Id. at 669; see also U.S. DEP'T
OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-161-2, reprinted in 2 INT'L L. 27 (1962) ("If the rebellious
side conducts its war by guerrilla tactics it seldom achieves the status of a belligerent
because it does not hold territory and it has no semblance of a government."); U.S.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAw OF LAND WARFARE 11(a) (1956)
[hereinafter FM 27-10] ("The customary law of war becomes applicable to civil war
upon recognition of the rebels as belligerents."); PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 809,
812-13, 815-16, 819, 831-32.
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In view of the above, any conflict between the United States and
al Qaeda as such cannot amount to war or trigger application of the
laws of war.25 Thus, outside the context of war to which the laws of
war apply (as in Afghanistan and Iraq) members of al Qaeda who were
not otherwise attached to the armed forces of a belligerent or state
cannot be "combatants," much less "enemy" or so-called "unlawful"
combatants, or prisoners of war as those terms and phrases are widely
known in both international and U.S. constitutional law. Also, "war"
or "armed conflict" and the laws of war could not have applied to the
September 11 attacks by al Qaeda operatives, although the attacks un-
doubtedly triggered other international laws involving criminal re-
sponsibility and universal jurisdiction, 26 including crimes against
humanity in connection with the targeting of the World Trade
Center.
With respect to the September 11 attacks as such, any attempt to
expand the concept of war beyond the present minimal levels of bel-
ligerency and insurgency would be extremely dangerous, because cer-
tain forms of nonstate actor violence and targetings that otherwise
remain criminal could become legitimate and create an extended but
unwanted form of combatant immunity.27 Two such targetings would
have been the September 11 attack on the Pentagon, a legitimate mili-
tary target during armed conflict or war (except for the means used-
a civil aircraft with passengers and crew), and the previous attack on
the U.S.S. Cole, another legitimate military target during armed con-
flict or war. Similarly, a radical extension of the status of war and the
laws of war to terrorist attacks by groups like al Qaeda (and there are
or predictably will be many such groups engaged in social violence)
would legitimize al Qaeda attacks on the President (as Commander in
25 See also Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1013-15
(2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the United States could not have been at war with the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which had engaged in terrorist
acts as a nonstate, nonbelligerent, noninsurgent actor). But see DerekJinks, September
11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1 (2003) (taking a different approach to the
question of whether the United States could be at war with al Qaeda). Similarly, com-
mon Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions assures that Geneva law is nonderogable,
allows no general exception in case of claimed necessity (e.g., where such does not
appear in a particular article such as GC Article 27), is not based on reciprocity, and
permits no reprisals. See GC, supra note 9, arts. 1, 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 288-90; GC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 15-17, 34, 37, 39, 47, 200-02, 204-05,
207, 228.
26 On the nature, history, and reach of universal jurisdiction to prosecute or al-
low civil sanctions against violations of customary international law, see, for example,
PAUST ET AI., supra note 2, at 157-76; and PAUST, supra note 13, at 420-23, 432-41.
27 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 21, at 330-32 (discussing combatant immunity).
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Chief) and various U.S. "military personnel and facilities" in the
United States and abroad-attacks of special concern to President
Bush, as noted in his November 13 Military Order. 28 Applying the
status of war and the laws of war to armed violence below the level of
an insurgency can have the unwanted consequence of legitimizing va-
rious other combatant acts and immunizing them from prosecution.
No leader of any country other than the United States is known to
have even suggested a need for such a radical change in the status of
war, the threshold levels concerning applicability of the laws of war,
and actual application of various laws of war (including an array of
competencies, rights, immunities, and obligations thereunder) to ter-
rorist targetings by groups like al Qaeda, and selective and propor-
tionate responsive measures against such groups which do not involve
the use of military force against the military of some other de facto or
de jure state. It is not clear that even President Bush contemplated
the corrupting consequences of such an extension of the status of war
or the laws of war. Such consequences would not be in the overall
and long-term interests of the United States or the international
community.
An additional negative consequence might involve an enhanced
status for terrorist perpetrators as they shift from international
criminals to an "enemy" able to engage in protracted "war" with cer-
tain "victories" against the United States. From the perspective of re-
ligious extremists willing to kill for power and cowardly dupes who
mistakenly believe they are on their way to heaven, the U.S. govern-
ment's acceptance of conditions of "war" could become a useful or-
ganizing and justifying tool, an unwitting gift turned into a rallying
cause.
C. Supposed Permissibility of Preemptive Self-Defense
Does international law permit unilateral preemptive self-defense
against perceived threats to a state's national security? I agree with
most states and international law scholars that absent an actual armed
attack on a state triggering the right of self-defense under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter and absent an authorization to use armed force
from the U.N. Security Council or an appropriate regional organiza-
tion, no state can lawfully engage in what some term preemptive self-
defense, and that a change in international law to permit preemptive
self-defense is not preferable from a policy oriented standpoint.29 Im-
28 See sources cited supra note 20.
29 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 22, at 537-38 & n.15, 557 n.125. Moreover, under
the U.N. Charter it is the Security Council that will decide whether a "threat" to peace
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portantly, neither the use of armed force by the United States on Oc-
tober 7, 2001, in Afghanistan nor the use of armed force on March 20,
2003 in Iraq were justified as preemptive self-defense. Use of force
against al Qaeda in Afghanistan was justified, and justifiable, as self-
defense against ongoing nonstate actor armed attacks by members of
al Qaeda on the United States and its nationals,30 although use of
force against the Taliban regime was highly problematic under inter-
national law.31 Both the U.N. Security Council and NATO recognized
the propriety of "self-defense" against such nonstate actor attacks,3 2
but it should be recalled that permissible self-defense actions against
nonstate actors within another state that are not directed at the state
itself or its military or general population do not create a state of
"war."33 Use of force in Iraq was justified,3 4 and justifiable, under
U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing armed force for various
exists. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39. If one exists, the Council will also decide whether to
authorize or mandate economic or other sanctions not involving the use of armed
force. Id. arts. 41, 42. The Bush Doctrine contained in his National Security Strategy
claims a broad unilateral authority unsupportable under international law to use mili-
tary force against "rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to
threaten or use weapons of mass destruction," "to preempt emerging threats" or an
"imminent threat," and "to counter a sufficient threat to our national security." See
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf. Of course, an emerging or imminent
threat is not even an actual threat.
30 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 22, at 533-36. It is also legitimate to capture the
attackers during self-defense actions, and such capture is not "arbitrary" detention or
impermissible kidnapping in a foreign state. See, e.g., id. at 538-39; see also PAUST ET
AL, supra note 23, at 479. However, when capture is made by an occupying power in
occupied territory, laws of war preclude the transfer of non-prisoners of war out of
occupied territory. See infra notes 119-20. The capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq
was most likely the capture of a prisoner of war.
31 See, e.g., Karl M. Meessen, Unilateral Recourse to Military Force Against Terrorist
Attacks, 28 YALE J. Ir'L L. 341, 345 (2003); Paust, supra note 22; at 540-43.
32 Paust, supra note 22, at 535 & nn.4-5.
33 See Sofaer, supra note 23 (discussing the supposed "war" against al Qaeda and
international "terrorism"); supra Part I.B. Yet, on October 7, 2001, the United States
used massive military force against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, thus triggering
war and application of the laws of war during that armed conflict.
34 See, e.g., Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to the United Nations Addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council (Mar. 21, 2003), U.N. Doc. S/2003/350, quoted in Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Addendum to Armed Force in Iraq: Issues of Legality, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr.
2003, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh99a1.htm; Letter from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America, to the United Nations Addressed to
the President of the Security Council (Mar. 21, 2003), U.N. Doc. S/2003/351; Lord
Goldsmith, U.K. Attorney-General, Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq (Apr. 2003),
at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3287.asp.
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purposes (including return of Kuwaiti property and foreign persons
detained in Iraq since 1990, restoration of peace and. security in the
region, and termination of the Iraqi regime's oppression of its peo-
ple-the latter two general purposes providing some support even for
regime change) ,' whether or not any weapons of mass destruction
would actually be found in Iraq or any direct links with al Qaeda at-
tacks existed (and presumably there were no such weapons or direct
links).
Some supporters of preemptive self-defense have misunderstood
and misused the early Caroline incident of 1837 to claim that, during
the Caroline incident, the United States and United Kingdom recog-
nized the permissibility of preemptive self-defense. Just the opposite
is true. At no time in the debate concerning the incident was there
any reference to the phrase "preemptive self-defense." All discussions
of international law focused on claims concerning the proper reach of
self-defense, and the context was undeniably one involving a series of
nonstate actor armed attacks on Canada by Canadian and U.S. insur-
gents operating within Canada and the United States. 36 If anything,
the U.S. claim sought a far more limiting form of self-defense than is
allowed today under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which in any
event otherwise expressly and unavoidably limits the inherent right of
self-defense to a circumstance of "armed attack. '37 U.S. Secretary of
35 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 22, at 549-50 & nn.77-78, 555-56 & nn. 121, 123
(addressing U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), 688 (1991),
949 (1994), and 1441 (2002)); see also S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 2978th
mtg. pmbl., 1, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991) (addressing the continued viability
of S.C. Res. 678); Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement of Jan. 14, 1993, reprinted
in IRAQ AND KUWAIT 741 (M. Weller ed., 1993) (remarking that the January 13, 1993
raids on Iraq by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States "received a man-
date from the Security Council, according to Resolution 678 and the cause of the raid
was the violation by Iraq of Resolution 687 concerning the cease-fire. So . . . this
action was taken and conforms to the Resolutions... and conforms to the Charter of
the United Nations"). But see Frederic L. Kirgis, Security Council Resolution 1441 on
Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament Obligations, ASIL INSIGHTS, Nov.
2002, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh92.htm; Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Le-
gality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2004); O'Connell, supra note 34;
Alain Pellet, L'agression, LE MONDE, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1.
36 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 23, at 535 & n.6; infra note 39 and accompanying
text.
37 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (recognizing the "inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs") (emphasis added); see also Paust, supra
note 22, at 534-35, 537-38. But see William C. Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them": A
Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1365 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, Reinventing the Security Council: The U.N. as a Lockean
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1529 (2004).
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State Daniel Webster would have limited the right of the United King-
dom (on behalf of Canada), even when it was experiencing ongoing
armed attacks by nonstate actors, to a circumstance where the actual
use of force in response to attacks presents a case "in which the neces-
sity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation," and he had ar-
gued that the self-defense measure or "means" actually utilized-an
attack by British forces on the ship Caroline while it was docked in U.S.
waters-failed to meet such a test, presumably because the British
forces could have waited until the vessel Caroline traveled into Cana-
dian waters. 38 After the incident, but before Webster's limiting claim,
there had been additional armed attacks from U.S. territory, 39 but this
did not lessen U.S. hostility to British claims concerning the self-de-
fense measure taken in U.S. territory.
D. Supposed "Legal No-Man's Lands"
Another misconception is that there are certain areas on earth
that are so-called "legal no-man's lands"40 wherein human beings have
no protections under relevant international law. Such a misconcep-
tion might be confused with a notion that there are certain illegal no-
legal-protection lands where actions take place in violation of interna-
tional law. In any event, under international law no locale is immune
from the reach of relevant international law. For example, at certain
times after October 7, 2001, and perhaps still in certain places, the
38 See Paust, supra note 22, at 535 n.6 (quoting Secretary of State Daniel Web-
ster); W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 3, 45 (1999). Today, the limits that exist are contained in far more malleable gen-
eral principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality considered in context plus
any relevant international law precluding the choice of particular tactics or weapons.
See also MYREs S. McDoUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 217 (1961). McDougal and Feliciano noted that standards of "neces-
sity" and "proportionality" have sometimes been "cast in language so abstractly restric-
tive as almost, if read literally, to impose paralysis. Such is the clear import of the
classical peroration of Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case." Id.
39 See KENNETH R. STEVENS, BORDER DIPLOMACY 12-13, 24-25, 35, 52, 62 (1989),
cited in Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Preemption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209
(2003).
40 SeeJean Eaglesham, Blair in Pledge on British Terror Suspects, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2003, at 7; Shame of Guantanamo, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 2003, at A22. Professor Harold
Koh has recently used the phrases "extra-legal zones" and "zones and persons outside
the law," although I believe merely for rhetorical purposes and to decry the Adminis-
tration's failures to uphold the law. See Harold Hongju Koh, Rights to Remember, ECON-
OMIST, Nov. 1, 2003, at 24.
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United States has been an occupying power in Afghanistan. 4 1 Simi-
larly, the United States is an occupying power in Iraq.42 Thus, in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq various laws of war concerning rights, duties, and
competencies applicable in occupied territory apply.43 While involved
in armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, various other laws of war
also apply during the armed conflicts that have occurred or are occur-
ring against the Taliban and Iraqi military forces under Saddam Hus-
sein (even today within Iraq if former Iraqi military personnel are part
of a belligerent or insurgent group engaged in armed hostilities inside
Iraq).44 Various other international laws, including human rights law,
also apply in such territories and within the United States. Thus,
neither Afghanistan nor Iraq are so-called "legal no-man's lands."
Under international law, which is part of the laws of the United
States for several purposes, 45 persons detained or transferred on U.S.
warships or military aircraft are within the equivalent of U.S. territory
with respect to the application of relevant international and U.S. do-
mestic laws and territorial jurisdiction. 46 Thus, persons on U.S. war-
41 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 24 n.67 (2001).
42 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1438, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1483 (2003) (noting the letter from the Permanent Representatives of the
United States and United Kingdom of May 8, 2003, "recognizing the specific authori-
ties, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states
as occupying powers under unified command"); Press Release, White House Office of
the Press Secretary, President's Statement on U.N. Vote Lifting Sanctions on Iraq
(May 22, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/
iraq/20030522-1 .html; Jordan J. Paust, The U.S. as Occupying Power Over Portions
of Iraq and Special Responsibilities Under the Laws of War (May 2003), available at
http://www.nimj.com/documents/occupation (1) .doc.
43 For an overview of some of the applicable laws, see Paust, supra note 42.
44 For an overview of some of the general laws of war, see, for example, PAUST ET
AL., supra note 2, at 803-54. Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003,
but armed violence has not ended.
45 See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 13, at 7-12, 56-57 n.68, 60 n.92, 169-73, 415-16.
46 See, e.g., id. at 417, 427 n.17; PAUST ET AL., supra note 23, at 404 & n.2, 414,
744-51, 758. U.S. warships are also "territory" over which the United States exercises
full sovereign power and jurisdiction, including the exercise of military justice and
other enforcement competencies. Under international law, persons onboard are pre-
sent in the "territory" of the United States. There should be no doubt, therefore,
about the reach of the U.S. Constitution to restrain Executive actions on board U.S.
warships and military aircraft. SeePAUST, supra note 13, at 488, 494-95, 498 n.8, 510
n.102; supra note 21. The United States also exercises jurisdictional competencies
over U.S. aircraft. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1301(38) (b) app. (2000) (discussing special
aircraft jurisdiction). Once onboard a U.S. warship or military aircraft, persons trans-
ferred elsewhere who remain under the control of the U.S. military should retain
relevant constitutional protections.
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ships and aircraft are not in areas without legal protection. Especially
relevant on such vessels and aircraft would be human rights law, the
laws of war applicable while the United States is engaged in armed
conflict in Afghanistan or Iraq, and even relevant constitutional
protections.
47
The U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is territory
under the complete control of the United States and is territory
within which various types of international law, including human
rights48 and relevant laws of war, apply. Guantanamo is territory spe-
cially occupied by the United States beyond the contemplated pur-
pose of the bilateral treaty with Cuba allowing the United States to use
Guantanamo as a naval coal-refueling station. Guantanamo is also ter-
ritory under the "complete jurisdiction and control" of the United
States pursuant to the treaty with Cuba, a treaty that provides Cuba
with only "ultimate sovereignty" and, thus, necessarily one that pro-
vides the United States certain forms of sovereign power in addition
to complete jurisdiction and control.49 However, Guantanamo is not
47 See Paust, supra note 42, at 24-25 (distinguishing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950)); supra notes 19, 46.
48 Some human rights and duties, such as those contained and incorporated by
reference in Articles 55(c) and 56 of the U.N. Charter, and those under customary
international law, are universal. Some apply only in the Americas, such as those set
forth in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX
(1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4, Rev. (1965), which is an authoritative in-
dicia of at least regional customary rights and duties and is otherwise binding on the
United States through the Charter of the Organization of American States. See Char-
ter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 3(k), 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3, amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721
U.N.T.S. 324; see also id. arts. 44, 111; Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Ser. A, No. 10, 45 (1989); Report on the Situation of the Inhabitants of the Interior of Ecua-
dorAffected by Development Activities, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. 7, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.96, doc. 10, rev. 1 (1997) ("The American Declaration ... continues to serve as a
source of international obligation for all member states."). Some human rights in-
struments apply within the territory of a signatory and also to all individuals where
they are "subject to its jurisdiction." See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173; FRANcIsco FORREST
MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S.
COuRTS 101 (2001). The latter circumstance would include individuals detained, for
example, on U.S. warships or in territory under the jurisdiction and control of the
United States such as Guantanamo, or more generally in occupied territory in Af-
ghanistan or Iraq, since they are clearly "subject to . . .jurisdiction" of the United
States in such places. Moreover, customary human rights reflected in the Interna-
tional Covenant, like all customary international laws, are universal in reach and im-
plicate universal jurisdiction. See supra note 26.
49 See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Cuba for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval
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a war-related occupied territory and, as such, certain laws of war and
presidential competencies applicable only in war-related occupied ter-
ritory do not apply.50 In any event, persons detained at Guantanamo
are not in an area devoid of legal restraints and protections. Moreo-
ver, the better view is that the U.S. Constitution also limits executive
authority at Guantanamo and anywhere else, since our government
and all who are within the Executive branch, including U.S. military
personnel, are entirely creatures of the Constitution and simply have
Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter Lease Agreement]; Gher-
ebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 2003); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v.
McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp.
298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1975); Paust, supra note 41, at 24-25; Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism
Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 692 &
n.68 (2002); cf Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir.
1995) (stating that Guantanamo is not U.S. territory as such). But see Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (assuming in error that habeas is only
available to persons within the sovereign territory of the United States and deciding in
error that the United States does not exercise any sort of sovereign jurisdiction and
control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), cert. granted sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1048-50 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(discussing the same errors concerning the proper reach of the habeas statute). Actu-
ally, the habeas statute does not require "sovereignty" or "territory" of the United
States but only United States "jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c) (3) (2000); Gher-
ebi, 352 F.3d at 1289; Paust, supra, at 690-94. Further, in contrast to Al Odah, the
United States not only exercises "jurisdiction," but also exercises "complete jurisdic-
tion and control over and within" Guantanamo of a sovereign nature under Article III
of the treaty with Cuba and as an occupying power exercising sovereign power incon-
sistent with the original purposes of the treaty; and, per terms of Article III of the
treaty, Cuba only has "ultimate" sovereignty and, thus by necessary implication, under
the treaty the United States clearly has some sovereign power at Guantanamo. Addi-
tionally, the United States is exercising a form of its sovereign power and jurisdiction
wherever it detains persons. Many other cases also recognize the reach of habeas with
respect to United States and foreign accused situated outside United States sovereign
territory and outside the territory where a particular district court sits. See, e.g., Gher-
ebi, 352 F.3d at 1288-89; Paust, supra, at 692 n.69. Of course, interpretation and ap-
plication of the treaty and customary international law are legal matters within the
competence and responsibility of the judiciary. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 111 cmts. c-e, 113 (1987) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]; PAUST, supra note 13, at 7-11, 16, 67-71, 169-73; PAUST ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 111-35, 171, 179-80. With respect to United States' use of Guanta-
namo inconsistent with the U.S.-Cuba treaty, the preamble set forth the purpose of
the lease: "To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to
protect the people thereof," and Article II stated that the United States could "gener-
ally... do any and all things necessary to fit the premises for use as coaling or naval
stations only, and for no other purpose." Lease Agreement, supra, pmbl., art. II.
50 See Paust, supra note 41, at 25 n.70 (explaining that a military commission can-
not properly be constituted or exercise lawful jurisdiction at Guantanamo Bay); see
also infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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no authority or lawful power to act here or abroad inconsistently with
the Constitution.5 1 Importantly, the text and structure of the Consti-
tution contain no territorial limitation and even contemplate a reach
to conduct abroad.
52
E. Supposed Unprotected Persons
1. The Reach of Human Rights Protections
Despite claims that certain persons, including "enemy combat-
ants" or so-called "unlawful combatants," have no rights, 53 no human
being is without protection under international law and the types of
protection are many. God's law is clear enough: love each as thyself.
54
Human law has evolved at least partly to fulfill such a fundamental
rule. For example, human rights law, which applies in times of rela-
tive peace or war,55 provides basic rights for every human being and
includes the fundamental right to human dignity.5 6 Some human
rights are derogable under special tests in times of public emergency
or other necessity, 57 but many human rights are nonderogable and
51 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25
(1942); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922); United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 220 (1882); ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-23, 127, 131 (1866);
United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 393-94 (C.C. Pa. 1798); United States v.
Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979); Paust, supra note 41, at 18-20.
52 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 10-11, 13-14; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 2;
id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIII (explaining that slavery is not permitted within
the United States "or any place subject to their jurisdiction").
53 See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War Can't Protect Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2001, at All (claiming that members of al Qaeda are unprivileged combat-
ants who do not have a right to "claim protection of the law"). But see Taft, supra note
11, at 321-22 (noting that even unprivileged combatants or terrorists have certain
legal rights and "are not 'outside the law"'); sources cited infra notes 56, 60-65.
54 See, e.g., Matthew 22:39; see also id. at 25:35-40, 42-45.
55 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 10, at 505-06 n.5.
56 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48,
pmbl., 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 ("Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent
dignity of the human person."); id. art. 10(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("All persons de-
prived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person."); id. art. 16, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("Everyone shall have
recognition everywhere as a person before the law."); id. art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179
("All persons shall be equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to the equal protection of the law."); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitu-
tional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry Into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145
(1983).
57 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48,
arts. 4(1), 18(3), 19(3), 22(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174, 178.
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are therefore absolute. 5 3 Certain human rights are also peremptory
jus cogens that cannot be derogated from and that preempt any other
laws. 59 Thus, in every circumstance, every human being has some
forms of protection under human rights law.
2. The Reach of Geneva Law Protections
Under the Geneva Conventions, there is no gap in the reach of at
least some forms of protection and rights of persons.60 Any person
detained, whether a prisoner of war, unprivileged belligerent, terror-
ist, or noncombatant, has at least minimum guarantees "in all circum-
stances" "at any time and in any place whatsoever" under common
Article 3.61 Such rights include the right to be "treated humanely,"
freedom from "cruel treatment and torture,"62 and freedom from "ou-
trages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment,"6 3 and minimum human rights to due process in case of
trial.64 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions assures the same
minimum guarantees to every person detained, regardless of status.
65
58 See, e.g., id. art. 4(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174; General Comment No. 24, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 1382d mtg. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), re-
printed in PAUST, supra note 13, at 376-77. The right to judicial review of the propriety
of detention is also recognized today as a nonderogable human right. See, e.g., Paust,
supra note 10, at 509-10.
59 See, e.g., General Comment No. 24, supra note 58, 8; RESTATEMENT, supra note
49, § 702 cmts. a, n; PAUST ET AL., supra note 23, at 49-53. Among jus cogens prohibi-
tions listed in the Restatement are: murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged
arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights. RESTATEMENT, supra note 49, § 702 (c)-(g).
60 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalit, Case No. IT-96-21-T, TrialJudgment, 271 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1996); GC COMMENTARY,
supra note 9, at 51, 595; INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 51 n.1, 76, 423 (Jean
S. Pictet ed., 1960); FM 27-10, supra note 24, 73; Paust, supra note 10, at 511-12 &
n.27.
61 See GC, supra note 9, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288; Derek Jinks,
Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2004).
62 See GC, supra note 9, art. 3(1) (a), 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
63 See id. art. 3(1)(c), 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
64 See id. art. 3(1) (d), 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290 (incorporating custom-
ary human rights to due process by reference); see also, Paust, supra note 10, at 511-12
& n.27.
65 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 37-38 [hereinafter Protocol I]; see also Taft, supra note 11, at
321-22 (stating that the customary "'safety-net'" of fundamental guarantees for all
persons found "expression in Article 75 of Protocol I," which the United States re-
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The test for prisoner of war status with respect to members of the
armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict is member-
ship in the armed forces.66 Persons who are "enemy combatants"
would be prisoners of war under the laws of war with membership in
the armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict as the
determining criterion for both combatant 67 and prisoner of war sta-
tus. 68 Unprivileged fighters are those who are not entitled to engage
in combat and to receive combatant immunity for lawful acts of war.69
Some of these phrases have been misused, as has the phrase "unlawful
combatant" since it confuses two separate issues concerning (1) a per-
son's status (e.g., as a combatant or a noncombatant who is not privi-
leged to engage in combat), and (2) a lack of immunity for personal
acts committed in violation of the laws of war.70 In any event, danger-
ous consequences can arise for U.S. and foreign military personnel if
the legal test for prisoner of war status is changed from membership
to some other test applicable, for example, only to certain militia or
volunteer corps.
71
3. The Prohibition of Secret Arrests and Detentions
Since September 11, the Bush Administration has refused to re-
lease the names and whereabouts of hundreds of persons detained as
"special interest" immigration detainees, 72 various persons detained as
gards "as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy
are entitled").
66 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 4(A)(1), 6 U.S.T., 3316, 3321, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138 [hereinafter GPW];
Paust, supra note 10, at 510-11 & n.23; Paust, supra note 21, at 332-33.
67 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 21, at 328-30.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 328-32.
70 See, e.g., id. at 332. Additionally, no one has immunity for war crimes or other
international crimes. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 13, at 422-23, 435-39 nn.69-72; FM
27-10, supra note 24, 1 498-99; id. 1 510 ("The fact that a person who committed an
act which constitutes a war crime acted as the head of a State or as a responsible
government official does not relieve him from responsibility for his act.").
71 See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 13, at 333-34.
72 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES 7, 17 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/re
ports/2002/us9l1/USA0802.pdf (hereinafter PRESUMPTION OF GUILT]; LAWYERS'
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF Loss: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEP-
TEMBER 11, at 19-21 (2002), available at http://www.lchr.org/USlaw/loss/lossre
port.pdf; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S. Supreme Court Should Review
and Reject Secret Detentions (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/
press/2003/09/us093003.htm; see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953
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material witnesses,7 3 and thousands of persons detained without trial
as alleged security threats here, at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and else-
where.7 4 Yet, refusal to disclose the names or whereabouts of such
detainees fits within the definition of forced disappearance of persons
that is proscribed by international law in all circumstances. 75 As the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States recog-
nizes, "causing the disappearance of individuals" is absolutely prohib-
ited under international law, 7 6 constitutes a violation of the customary
human rights of the persons who disappear, 77 and constitutes a viola-
tion of a peremptory prohibition jus cogens.78 Thus, forced disappear-
ance is a prohibition that preempts more ordinary international law
(2002) (discussing the United States' treatment of citizens and noncitizens post-Sep-
tember 11).
73 See, e.g., PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, supra note 72, at 17; Michael J. Kelly, Executive
Excess v. Judicial Process: American Judicial Responses to the Government's War on Terror, 13
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 787, 808-11 (2003); Edward Walsh, Court Upholds a Post-9/
11 Detention Tactic, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2003, at All.
74 See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIB-
ERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 52-53 (2003), available
at http://www.lchr. org/pubs /descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormal . pdf
[hereinafter ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL]; Paust, supra note 10, at 529-30; Dan Chap-
man, Al-Qaida Cases Blur Rules on Interrogations, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Mar. 4, 2003, at IA
(stating that "U.S. officials say more than 3000 al-Qaida members and supporters have
been detained worldwide since Sept. 11," some in Afghanistan, some on Diego Garcia
in the Indian Ocean, some 650 at Guantanamo Bay, some "in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, whose governments are known to allow torture," and others in places un-
known); Daphne Eviatar, Foreigners' Rights In the Post-9/11 Era: A Matter ofJustice, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at B7 (reporting that "[m] ore than 5000 citizens of foreign coun-
tries have been detained"); Amnesty Int'l, Memorandum to the U.S. Government on
the Rights of People in U.S. Custody in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay 23-27
(Apr. 15, 2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidocpdf.nsf/Index/
AMR510532002ENGLISH/$File/AMR5105302.pdf; Katharine Q. Seelye, Moscow, Seek-
ing Extradition, Says 3 Detainees Are Russian, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at Al 3.
75 See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons,
June 9, 1994, art. II, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1530 (1994); Declaration on the Protec-
tion of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (1992), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 903 (1993); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710-12 (N.D. Cal. 1988); see also infra notes 76-83.
76 RESTATEMENT, supra note 49, § 702(c); see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 277-79 (3d ed. 2002) (addressing several cases before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights); Maureen R. Berman & Roger S. Clark,
State Terrorism: Disappearances, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 531 passim (1982) (discussing disap-
pearances as a form of government sponsored terrorism); Richard J. Wilson & Jan
Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights System, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 651 passim
(2003) (reviewing cases from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
77 RESTATEMENT, supra note 49, § 702, cmts. a, c, n, rptr. notes 1, 11.
78 Id. cmt. n, rptr. note 12.
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and allows for no derogation under any circumstances. 79 Similarly,
the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights has declared that "unacknowledged deten-
tion" of persons is a violation of human rights law and is "not subject
to derogation."80 U.S. cases also recognize that forced disappearance
violates customary and treaty-based international law,81 and both Con-
gress8 2 and the Executive8 3 have made the same recognitions with re-
spect to foreign violations.
Within the Americas, the preamble to the Inter-American Con-
vention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons also affirms "that the
forced disappearance of persons violates numerous non-derogable
and essential human rights enshrined in the American Convention on
Human Rights, in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ' 84 Addi-
79 Id. rptr. note 11; PAUST ET AL., supra note 23, at 49-51.
80 General Comment No. 29, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 1905th mtg. 13(b),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).
81 See, e.g., In re Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184-85 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.
Supp. at 710-712 (N.D. Cal. 1988); see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845-46
(11 th Cir. 1996) (discussing campaign of arbitrary imprisonments, torture, and other
forms of terror); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980) (explaining
that arbitrary detention violates customary international law), affd on other grounds,
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (using international law as an aid in interpreting a
federal statute, while holding that arbitrary detention violates the statute); Alfonso
Chardy, Fernandez Larios Found Liable for Chilean Official's Death, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
16, 2003 (addressing $4 million jury verdict regarding crimes against humanity and
various human rights violations as well as the disappearance of some 3200 persons
during the Pinochet regime in Chile).
82 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (2000); S. REP. No. 102-249, at9 (1991), quoted
in Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 172.
83 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Argentina, in 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMANq
RIGHTS PRAcTiCES, at 3-5 (2000); id. Burundi, at 4; id. Columbia, at 15-17; id. Guate-
mala, at 15; id. Peru, at 6; id. Sudan, at 5. The 1999 Country Reports are available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1999-hrp-report/99hrp-toc.html.
Country Reports for 2002 are available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2002. For example, disappearances in Iraq during Saddam Hussein's regime are ad-
dressed in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Iraq, in 2002 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, at 3-5 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18
277.htm.
84 Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra
note 75, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 1530. Technically, the Convention does "not apply to the
international armed conflicts governed by the 1949 Geneva Convention [s]," but this
certainly does not eliminate applicability of relevant customary international and
treaty-based human rights and other proscriptions, especially those identified in the
Convention. Id. art. XV, 33 I.L.M. at 1532; see also supra note 48 and accompanying
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tionally, the Convention on Forced Disappearance recognizes that
forced disappearance is a crime that is "a grave and abominable of-
fense against the inherent dignity of the human being, and one that
contradicts the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of
the Organization of American States,"8 5 and affirms "that the system-
atic practice of the forced disappearance of persons constitutes a
crime against humanity. ' '8 6 Such shameful practices of a criminal na-
ture can in no way be justified under international law and they must
stop.
Secret arrests and detentions also violate other international laws
requiring, without exception, that foreign persons who are "arrested
... or detained in any.., manner" shall be free to communicate with
consular officers of their state and to have access to them, and recog-
nizing that the consulate officers from their state shall have concomi-
tant freedoms8 7 as well as "the right to visit" their nationals who are
text. Moreover, in case of an international armed conflict, the rights and duties
under the Geneva Conventions apply. See, e.g., GC, supra note 9, arts. 5, 25, 71,
106-07, 6 U.S.T. at 3520-22, 3534-36, 3562, 3588-90, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92,
304-306, 332, 358-60. Yet, in occupied territory, only "where absolute military secur-
ity so requires," a non-prisoner of war rightly detained without trial under Geneva law
standards can "be regarded as having forfeited rights of [private] communication."
See GC, supra note 9, arts. 5, 42, 6 U.S.T. at 3520-22, 3544, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92, 314.
However, even such persons who are detained in occupied territory cannot simply
disappear or have their names kept secret. As the authoritative Commentary to the
GC prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross explains, "[t]he De-
taining Power is, however, in no way released from its obligation to notify the arrest to
its official Information Bureau for transmission to the official Information Bureau of
the country of which the person concerned is a national." GC COMMENTARY, supra
note 9, at 57-58; see also id. at 56 ("[T]he Detaining Power... remains fully bound by
the obligation, imposed on it by Article 136, to transmit to the official Information
Bureau particulars of any protected person who is kept in custody for more than two
weeks.").
85 Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra
note 75, pmbl. The O.A.S. Charter is treaty law of the United States. See supra note
48.
86 Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra
note 75, pmbl.; see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(citing O.A.S. General Assembly Res. 666 (Nov. 18, 1983)) (stating that disappearance
is a crime against humanity). Concerning the nature of crimes against humanity
more generally, see, for example, PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 857-915. Such crimes
also implicate universal jurisdiction for criminal or civil sanctions in any state that has
an offender within its territory, occupied territory, or the equivalent of its territory
under international law. See supra note 26.
87 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art.
36(1) (a), 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292; see also The Right to Information on
Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory
Opinion OC-16/99 (Oct. 1, 1999), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ser. A, No. 16, 77-84
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"in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with...
[them] and to arrange for . . . [their] legal representation."8 8 Such
nonderogable rights of communication and visitation have generally
been of great significance to the United States and our nationals with
respect to protections for U.S. citizens arrested abroad, and they
should not be placed in further jeopardy.
F. Supposed Legality of Torture or Cruel, Inhumane Treatment
Since September 11, we have seen claims to interrogate human
beings with moderate coercion and "stress and duress" tactics that
might or might not constitute torture, but in any event can constitute
cruel and inhuman treatment in violation of nonderogable human
rights and Geneva law.89 As noted in another writing, customary and
(1999), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/A/OC-16ingles-sinfirm
as.html; Frederic L. Kirgis, Restitution as a Remedy in U.S. Courts for Violations of Interna-
tional Law, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 341 (2001).
88 Vienna Convention, supra note 87, art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S.
at 292.
89 See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, "To Respect and To Ensure". Reconciling International
Human Rights Obligations in a Time of Terror, 97 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 23, 24 (2003);
John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64 U. PrrT. L. REV.
237, 249-54 (2003); Paust, supra note 10, at 530-31; Gary Younge, US Soldiers Sent
Home for Beating Prisoners of War, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 6, 2004, at 17; see also
Steven W. Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... ": Assessing the Aftermath of September
11th, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 612 (2003);John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating
Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be An Option?, 63 U. PrrT. L. REv. 743 passim (2002);
Raymond Bonner et al., Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 1; Chapman, supra note 74 (addressing sleep deprivation,
forced standing for hours, and "stress-and-duress" techniques); Andrew Gumbel,
America Admits Suspects Died in Interrogation, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 7, 2003;
Iraqi General Dies in American Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at A26; Vernon Loeb,
Army Fines Officer for Firing Pistol Near Iraqi Detainee, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2003, at A18;
Eric Schmitt, Three Soldiers Are Charged With Assault on Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2003, at A10; Jonathan Turley, U.S. "Interrogations" Border on Torture, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany), Mar. 11, 2003, at A7; Terror Pair Tortured, Says Lawyer, HERALD SUN (Mel-
bourne), Oct. 9, 2003, at 28; Lord Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black
Hole, Twenty-Seventh FA Mann Lecture, British Inst. of Int'l & Comp. Law (Nov. 25,
2003), available at http://www.nimj.com/documents/Guantanamo.pdf.
In Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1978), the European
Court of Human Rights held that prior U.K. interrogation techniques of "wall-stand-
ing," hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and
drink constituted "inhuman" and "degrading" treatment in violation of human rights
law. Id. at 41, 66. The court noted that the "techniques were applied in combination,
with premeditation and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual bodily injury,
at least intense physical and mental suffering to the persons subjected thereto and
also led to acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation," and, "accordingly,"
were forms of inhuman treatment. Id. at 66. The court concluded that the "tech-
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treaty-based human rights law requires, without exception, that no
person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane, or degrad-
ing treatment.90 The same absolute prohibition exists under custom-
ary and treaty-based laws of war.91 For example, common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, which is also customary international law
and applies today both during insurgencies and armed conflicts of an
international character, 92 requires that every person detained "shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely," and that "[t]o this end ... at
any time and in any place ... cruel treatment and torture" are pro-
niques were also degrading, since they were such as to arouse in their victims feelings
of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possi-
bly breaking their physical or moral resistance." Id. The court found, however, that
they did not constitute "torture" because they did not produce an intensity of suffer-
ing "causing very serious and cruel suffering." Id.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
defines torture, for purposes of the Convention, as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.
Id. art. 1(1), S. TREAY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113. U.S. legislation imple-
ments the treaty for criminal sanctions. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000 & Supp. 2003).
Other legislation allows civil sanctions. See, e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000); Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
Professor Alan Dershowitz has even suggested that laws should be violated by use
of torture. See Alan Dershowitz, Commentary: Painful Moral Questions, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
17, 2003, at 15; see also Mark Bowden, The Persuaders: Wen Does Coercion Become Torture,
OBSERVER MAG., Oct. 19, 2003, at 28; David Cole, Lauyers Keep Out, NATION, Apr. 21,
2003, at 4. He has co-conspirators among academic ranks. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan
III, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against International Terrorism: Revisiting the
Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN. L. REv. 831, 831-32, 851 (1987). But seeJordan J.
Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REv.
697, 721-35 (1987); supra notes 19, 51-52 (recognizing that the Constitution re-
strains executive authority to act here or abroad).
90 Paust, supra note 10, at 530 & n.132. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 49,
§ 702(d) cmts. a, n, rptr. note 11 (forms of "torture or other cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment or punishment" are proscribed under customary human rights law
and are prohibitions jus cogens that preempt any other law).
91 See Paust, supra note 10, at 530-31; GC, supra note 9, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at
3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90; id. art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92;
id. art. 16, 6 U.S.T. at 3528, 75 U.N.T.S. at 298; id. art. 27, 6 U.S.T. at 3536, 75
U.N.T.S. at 306; id. art. 31, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308; id. art. 33, 6 U.S.T. at
3538-40, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308-10; id. art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
92 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 10, at 512 n.27.
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scribed in addition to "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment."93 Despite claims by some to
relax the prohibitions, the prohibitions are absolute, and violations of
any relevant laws of war would be prosecutable as war crimes.94 Addi-
tionally, "torture or inhuman treatment" or "wilfully causing great suf-
fering or serious injury to body or health" are among the more serious
war crimes listed as "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions.95 As
the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State wrote recently, ter-
rorists have the "right to humane treatment-a right that belongs to
all humankind, in war and in peace. . . . [I]nhumane treatment is
cruel and unacceptable under any circumstances."96 Indeed, torture
and cruelty offend the human soul, our basic sense of fairness, and
our common dignity and humanity.
Finally, the United States and its nationals cannot avoid responsi-
bility under international law by merely transferring persons to other
states for torture or cruel and inhumane interrogation. The United
States cannot lawfully transfer persons to another country where they
face a "real risk" of human rights violations, 97 and law of war obliga-
tions of the United States and its nationals cannot be avoided where
the United States or a national is complicit in violations,98 much less a
co-conspirator.
93 GC, supra note 9, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
94 See, e.g., FM 27-10, supra note 24, 499 ("Every violation of the law of war is a
war crime."); PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 821-23, 829, 831-33.
95 See, e.g., GPW, supra note 66, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238; GC,
supra note 9, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
96 See Taft, supra note 11, at 321.
97 See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1832; The Soer-
ing Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-36, 44 (1989). Further, the United States
must not extradite or otherwise transfer persons to a foreign country where there will
be a "real risk" of violations of human rights or rights or duties under the laws of war.
See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 349, 352-53, 396 (quoting Jefferson in Ex parte
Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78, 81 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 7,597): "[T]o deliver fugitives from
them would be to become their accomplices."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 49, §§ 475,
cmt. g, 476, cmt. h, 711, rptr. note 7.
98 Concerning complicity, see, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 39-43; PAUST,
supra note 13, at 210, 286-87, 291. Additionally, the Geneva Conventions create a
duty to respect "and to ensure respect for" the Conventions "in all circumstances."
See, e.g., GC, supra note 9, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288; GC COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 9, at 15-17. Geneva law duties are obligatio erga omnes, owed by and to
all humankind. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 23, at 48. Further, the state to which
an individual can otherwise be transferred must be willing and able to comply with
Geneva law. See, e.g., GPW, supra note 66, art. 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146;
see also Paust, supra note 41, at 16 n.36 (citing examples of extraditions refused on
such grounds). Transfer of non-prisoners of war out of occupied territory is a war
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II. ADDITIONAL ERRORS AND CONCERNS
A. Required Judicial Review of the Propriety of Detention
In another article, I outlined human rights and law of war stan-
dards concerning the permissibility of detention of persons without
trial who pose significant security threats. Human rights law requires
that such forms of detention not be "arbitrary," though detention can
be permissible if it is reasonably needed under the circumstances. 99
The Geneva Civilian Convention also allows detention of such persons
without trial during an international war, but certain persons can only
be detained in the United States or in occupied territory if their de-
tention is necessary under the circumstances. 100 In every case, there
crime. See GC, supra note 9, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318; id. art. 147, 6
U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388; infra notes 118-19.
99 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 10, at 505-07.
100 Id. at 512-14. Recently, a Second Circuit panel ruled that the Non-Detention
Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000), precluded Executive detention of U.S. citi-
zens because the Act requires that U.S. citizens shall not be "detained by the United
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress," and no such legislation exists. Padilla
v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718-24 (2d. Cir. 2003). However, the issue is more com-
plex given the authority under treaty law of the United States to detain certain per-
sons under certain circumstances. First, the 1971 congressional limitation of
authority to detain should be interpreted consistently with 1949 treaty-based authority
to detain outlined in the GC. When a clash between the two is unavoidable, there
must be a clear, unequivocal intent of Congress to override prior treaty law for the
legislation to prevail under the last-in-time rule (which is not evident from the face of
the 1971 legislation or legislative history addressed by the Second Circuit panel, cf id.
at 718-19 (meant to limit power during war)). Even when such an intent can be
demonstrated, there are Supreme Court based exceptions to the last-in-time rule that
assure the primacy of treaty law and one such exception requires that the law of war
(at least duties and rights thereunder) prevail. See PAUST, supra note 13, at 99-107,
120. More generally, presidential power can be enhanced by international law since
the President must faithfully execute law, including international law, and the duty
creates a competence to do so. See, e.g., id. at 9, 16, 44-47, 79, 82, 88, 180, 185, 457,
468-69, 480-81. Following this approach, it might be argued that the President's
authority to detain under Geneva law prevails over the 1971 Act.
Nonetheless, the competence of the United States to detain certain persons
under Articles 5, 42, and 78 of the GC would be exercisable merely by Congress if
cases such as Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), are followed by
analogy. In Brown, the majority recognized that the laws of war created a competence
for the United States to seize enemy property located within the United States but
held that such a competence must be exercised by Congress. Id. at 128-29. In dis-
sent, Justice Story suggested that the President could execute that competence, since
all were in agreement that the President was bound to execute the law of war during a
war declared by Congress, and that Congress had set no legislative limits on the Presi-
dent's power to execute such laws or to carry on the war. Id. at 145, 149, 153 (Story,
J., dissenting). If one follows Story's approach in this case, however, Congress has set
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must be available independent, fair, effective, and meaningful judicial
review of the propriety of detention,' 0 ' a requirement that the present
Administration has failed adequately to permit. 0 2 Numerous cases
throughout our history also make clear the power and responsibility
of U.S. courts ultimately to determine the status and rights of detain-
ees under human rights law and the laws of war. 10 3 More generally,
a limit on the power to detain U.S. persons and the congressional limit would prevail.
Congress does have power to place certain limits on the exercise of presidential pow-
ers during war and occupation. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 275 (1990) (noting that "restrictions on" executive use of "armed force" can be
imposed by "treaty, or legislation"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 602, 609-10 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 635-36 n.2, 654-55
(Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 659-60 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at 662 (Clark, J.,
concurring); Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266 (1909) (discussing limits during
occupation); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (noting that
Congress has the power to "conduct a war"); The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 421, 427-28 (1814) (regarding seizure of ships abroad); Brown, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) at 110 (regarding seizure of property in the United States); Little v. Barreme,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (regarding seizure of ships abroad); Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (same); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37,
40-42 (1800) (same); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1228-31 (C.C.D.N.Y.
1806) (No. 16,342) (Paterson, J., on circuit) (regarding use of force abroad); 9 Op.
Att'y Gen. 516, 518-19 (1860) (noting that Congress can limit use of "land and naval
forces" that are otherwise "under his orders as their commander-in-chief"); see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (stating that Congress has power to "make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress power
to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces"); id.
art. I, §8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foreign powers"). Recognition that the
Geneva Conventions prevail over the 1971 legislation would not answer the question
whether it is Congress or the Executive that has the power to exercise a treaty-based
competence on behalf of the United States to detain certain persons even though the
Executive is bound to comply with duties and rights based in Geneva law (and, simi-
larly, Congress cannot abrogate duties or rights or authorize their infraction). See, e.g.,
PAUST, supra note 13, at 106-07,109. Nor would it answer the question whether con-
gressional power exists to set limits and, thus, has primacy in case the power to detain
is generally shared. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862), are no help
because in earlier legislation Congress had specifically authorized the use of force in
response to invasions or insurrections and had placed no other limits in the
legislation.
101 Paust, supra note 10, at 507-10, 514, 518-26, 528-29; see also Gherebi v. Bush,
352 F.3d. 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing jurisdictional issues and judicial power re-
garding Guantanamo Bay detainees).
102 See, e.g., Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1280-81; Paust, supra note 10, at 503-04, 527-29.
103 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 10, at 518-25, 529; see also Gherebi, 352 F.3d at
1282-84. Such power exists in international law, which is part of the laws of the
United States, and is constitutionally based. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 49,
§ 111 cmts. d-e, rptr. note 4; Paust, supra note 10, at 507-10, 514-18.
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ChiefJustice Marshall recognized early in our history that our judicial
tribunals "are established . . . to decide on human rights." 10 4 In a
democracy adhering to law and the proper balance and separation of
powers, it could not be otherwise.
B. Present DOD Rules of Procedure for Military Commissions
Since 9/11, we have witnessed the deliberate creation of rules of
procedure for U.S. military commissions that would violate human
rights and Geneva Convention guarantees10 5 and create war crime
civil and criminal responsibility for those directly participating in their
creation and application if the military commission rules are not
changed and are utilized. 10 6 We have seen a refusal to even disclose
the names of persons detained, and executive claims are made before
our courts and media that human beings have no human rights or
Geneva law protections, no right of access to an attorney or to their
consulate, and no right of access to a court of law to address the pro-
priety of their detention without trial.' 0 7 Present Department of De-
fense rules for military commissions would assure denial of the human
rights to trial before a regularly constituted, competent, independent,
and impartial court;1 08 to counsel of one's choice and to effective rep-
104 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810); see also supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 89, at 563, 580-86; Paust, supra note 49, at 677-90;
Paust, supra note 41, at 10-18; Evan J. Wallach, Afghanistan, Quirin, and Uchiyama:
Does the Sauce Suit the Gander?, Alofty LAw., Nov. 2003, at 40, 43-45; Joshua Rozenberg,
Law Chief Calls on US to Give Terror Suspects Fair Trial, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON),
Sept. 19, 2003, at I (identifying, through U.K. Attorney-General Goldsmith, some of
the British complaints about lack of ajury, secret hearings, restrictions on counsel for
the accused, and the lack of judicial review); see also ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL,
supra note 74, at 57-58, 60-61; Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Adminis-
tration's Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 433 passim (2002)
(relating recent military tribunals to others through history in the light of interna-
tional law);Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Mili-
tary Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649 (2002); Blair
Wants Britons' Legal Status Resolved, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 23, 2003, at A23 (noting that
Prime Minister Tony Blair reiterated concerns "about the form of trial that they [U.K
nationals] will have under a military commission"); Lord Johan Steyn, supra note 89,
at 11-12, 18.
106 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 41, at 4 n.12, 10 n.18, 28 n.81; Paust, supra note 49,
at 694; Wallach, supra note 105, at 45-46.
107 See generally Paust, supra note 10 passim; sources cited supra notes 72-74.
108 See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 309, 360-61; Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime,
Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1, 9-12,
58-59 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
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resentation;10 9 to fair procedure and fair rules of evidence; 10 to re-
view by a competent, independent, and impartial court of law;"' and
to various other human rights.'1 2 Clearly, the rules should be
changed.
Moreover, a serious violation of the separation of powers exists
with respect to the total lack of judicial review of military commission
decisions concerning offenses against the laws of war (which have
been incorporated by Congress as offenses against the laws of the
United States 13 ) and other international crimes over which there is
concurrent jurisdictional competence in federal district courts.
114
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitution, Congress
merely has power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court" and, thus, tribunals subject to ultimate control by the Supreme
Court.1 15 For this reason, the congressional authorization for creation
INT'L L. 337, 338-39 (2002); Paust, supra note 49, at 687-88; Detlev F. Vagts, Which
Courts Should Ty Persons Accused of Terrorism?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 313, 322 (2003); see
also NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 330-31 (2003);
Sandra Day O'Connor, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the Judiciary, 2 CHINESEJ.
INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2003) (quoting the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Consti-
tution, art. 29, which "framed byJohn Adams, boldly declares, 'It is the right of every
citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity
will admit,'" and adding that, " [i] ndividual judicial independence is necessary if each
case is to be resolved on its own merits, according to the facts and the law").
109 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 49, at 690.
110 See, e.g., id. at 688-89.
111 See, e.g., id. at 685-86; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 n.66 (1957)
(" [L] iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every-
thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments.") (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
112 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 49, at 678-85 (including impermissible discrimina-
tion on the basis of national origin, denial of equal access to courts and to equality of
treatment and equal protection of the law, "denials of justice" in violation of custom-
ary international law, and denial of the human right to fair, meaningful, and effective
judicial review of the propriety of detention).
113 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821 (2000) ("concurrent jurisdiction"); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946); ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942); United
States v. Schultz, 4 C.MR. 104, 111 (C.M.A. 1952); Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The
Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REv. 6,
10-12 (1971).
114 Concerning concurrent competence in federal district courts, see, for exam-
ple, 28 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000); Paust, supra note 113, at 17-28; and sources cited supra
note 113.
115 See also James E. Pfander, Federal Courts: Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme
Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1433, 1454-56 (2000) ("Like
other provisions of Article I that operate as restrictions on legislative power, the Infer-
ior Tribunals Clause underscores the inability of Congress to fashion new courts to
displace the constitutional supremacy of the one supreme court.").
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of ad hoc military commissions in 10 U.S.C. § 821 is subject to the
constitutional restraint contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 9.
Limitations of presidential power to set up a military commission
pose an additional problem. The President's power to set up a mili-
tary commission and the jurisdictional competence of a military com-
mission are limited in terms of time to a circumstance of actual war
until peace is finalized" 16 and are limited in terms of the place for its
direct functioning to a theater of war or a war related occupied terri-
tory. 117 The U.S. military base at Guantanamo is neither in a theater
of actual war nor in a war related occupied territory,11 8 and, thus, a
military commission at Guantanamo would not be properly consti-
tuted and would be without lawful jurisdiction.
Another problem with respect to prosecution of certain persons
in a military commission at Guantanamo involves an absolute prohibi-
tion under the laws of war. Any person who is not a prisoner of war
and who is captured in occupied territory in Afghanistan or Iraq must
not be transferred out of occupied territory. Article 49 of the GC ex-
pressly mandates that "[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers . . .of
protected persons from occupied territory ... are prohibited, regard-
less of their motive."1 19 Further, "unlawful deportation or transfer" is
116 See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-48 (1952) (discussing power
"related to war" and "common-law war courts"); Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11-13; Quifin,
317 U.S. at 28; The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 132-33 (1869) (permitting
jurisdiction "so long as the war continued," and "during war"); Cross v. Harrison, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190 (1853) (permitting jurisdiction until "treaty of peace"); 24
Op. Att'y Gen. 570, 571 (1903); Paust, supra note 41, at 5 & n.14, 9, 25 n.70.
117 See The Grapeshot176 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 132-33 (identifying war related occupied
territory as "wherever the insurgent power was overthrown"); WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 836 (2d ed. 1920):
A military commission .. .can legally assume jurisdiction only of offences
committed within the field of command of the convening commander....
[Regarding military occupation, a commission] "cannot take cognizance of
an offence committed without such territory .... The place must be the
theatre of war or a place where military government or martial law may be
legally exercised; otherwise a military commission . . . will have no
jurisdiction.
Id.; Paust, supra note 41, at 5 & n.14, 25 n.70, 26-27; see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (discussing tribunals in "occupied enemy territory"); id. at
326 (Murphy, J., concurring) (noting that martial law is limited to cases where "a
foreign invasion or civil war actually closes the courts"); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97
U.S. 509, 515 (1878) ("when ... in the enemy's country"); id. at 517 (when in occupa-
tion of enemy territory).
118 See Paust, supra note 41, at 25 n.70.
119 GC, supra note 9, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318; see also id. art. 76
6 U.S.T. at 3566, 75 U.N.T.S. at 336 (noting that "persons accused of offences shall be
detained in the occupied country"); Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 85(4) (a), 1125
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not merely a war crime; it is also a "grave breach" of the Geneva Con-
ventions. 120 To correct such violations of the laws of war, persons who
are not prisoners of war and who were captured in occupied territory
and eventually found at Guantanamo or other areas under U.S. con-
trol outside of occupied territory should be returned to the territory
where they were captured.
CONCLUSION
What has especially marked this Administration and some of its
most ardent supporters with respect to responses after 9/11 are at-
tempts at radical destruction of civil liberties, human rights, and rights
under the Geneva Conventions, as well as a quest for unreviewable
and unchecked executive powers. Serious short and long-term conse-
quences can ensue for the United States, other countries, U.S. and
other military personnel, and other U.S. nationals if violations of such
rights do not stop. As noted elsewhere, what resonates more than the
details of deprivation is the grating, mean-spirited, and ultimately anti-
American tone of the entire effort.121 The violations are unnecessary.
They degrade this country, its values, and its influence. They can ful-
fill terrorist ambitions122 and pose long-term threats greater than the
September 11 attacks.
U.N.T.S. at 42; GC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 278-80, 363; Paust, supra note 41, at
24 n.68 (discussing further unlawful transfers). Additionally, ights and duties under
the Geneva Conventions must be applied "in all circumstances." GC, supra note 9,
art. 1, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288; see also supra note 98.
120 GC, supra note 9, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388; Protocol I,
supra note 65, art. 85(4) (a), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 42; GC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at
280, 599; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2) (a) (vii),
(b) (viii), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999,
1006-07 (1998).
121 Paust, supra note 49, at 694.
122 See Bennoune, supra note 89, at 25 (arguing that if illegal means are used in
response to terrorism, the impermissibility of terrorist means might blur and the ille-
gal methods of governmental response might deconstruct the impermissibility of
strategies of the terrorists as well). Bennoune warns that "'counterterrorism is preg-
nant with future terrorists'" and, hence, doomed to failure. Id.; see also Sir Adam
Roberts, Role of Law in the "War on Terror" A Tragic Clash, 97 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L.
18, 19-20 (2003) (detailing pitfalls of governments acting outside the law in dealing
with terrorists); Lord Johan Steyn, supra note 89 (expressing concern that "un-
checked abuse of power begets ever greater abuse of power").
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